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Vintage-differentiated regulations (VDRs) are standards that are fixed with respect to the 
date of entry of regulated units, with later vintages facing more stringent standards. VDRs play 
prominent roles under major Federal, state, and local environmental laws. This paper synthesizes 
what is known about the effects of environmental VDRs, and develops lessons for public policy 
and for research. Economic theory suggests that such age-discriminatory regulations retard 
turnover of the capital stock, drive up the cost of environmental protection, and can increase 
pollution levels. Empirical studies validate theoretical predictions that VDRs delay replacement 
of durable goods, and thereby increase aggregate pollution abatement costs. In some cases, 
empirical studies also validate the perverse consequence that environmental progress is itself 
retarded. 










 Vintage-differentiated  regulation  (VDR) is a common feature of many 
environmental and other regulatory policies in the United States. Under VDR, standards 
for regulated units are fixed in terms of the units’ respective dates of entry, or “vintage,” 
with later entrants facing more stringent regulation. In the most common application, 
often referred to as “grandfathering,” units produced prior to a specific date are exempted 
from  new regulation or face less stringent requirements. 
 
  The vintage-differentiated approach has long appealed to many participants in the 
policy community, for reasons associated with efficiency, equity, and simple politics. 
First, it is frequently more cost-effective—in the short-term—to introduce new pollution-
abatement technologies at the time that new plants are constructed than to retrofit older 
facilities with such technologies. Second, it seems more fair to avoid changing the rules 
of the game in mid-stream, and hence to apply new standards only to new plants. Third, 
political pressures tend to favor easily-identified existing facilities rather than undefined 
potential facilities.  
 
  On the other hand, VDRs can be expected—on the basis of standard investment 
theory—to retard turnover in the capital stock (of durable plants and equipment), and 
thereby to reduce the cost-effectiveness of regulation in the long-term, compared with 
equivalent undifferentiated regulations.
1 A further irony is that, when this slower turnover 
results in delayed adoption of new, cleaner technology, VDR can result in higher levels 
of pollutant emissions than would occur in the absence of regulation.  
 
  In this Article, I survey previous applications and synthesize current thinking 
regarding VDRs in the environmental realm, and develop lessons for public policy and 
for future research. In Part 2, I describe the ubiquitous nature of VDRs in U.S. regulatory 
policy, and examine the reasons why VDRs are so common. In Part 3, I establish a 
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theoretical framework for analysis of the cost-effectiveness of alternative types of 
environmental policy instruments to provide a context for the analysis of VDRs. In Part 
4, I focus on the effects of VDRs, and describe a general theory of the impacts of these 
instruments in terms of their effects on technology adoption, capital turnover, pollution 
abatement costs, and environmental performance. In Parts 5 and 6, I examine empirical 
analyses of the impacts of VDRs in two significant sectors: Part 5 focuses on the effects 
of VDRs in the U.S. auto industry, and Part 6 on the effects of new source review, which 
is a form of VDR, in power generation and other sectors. In Part 7, I examine 
implications for policy and research, and recommend avenues for improvements in both.  
 
2. The Prevalence of Vintage-Differentiated Regulation 
 
  VDRs are found throughout U.S. regulatory policy. They are prominent features 
of a diverse set of federal environmental statutes and regulations, state and local 
environmental laws, as well as of a host of non-environmental regulations (Table 1). In 
this section of the Article, I summarize the use of VDRs in the environmental realm, and 
then examine explanations for the prevalence of these approaches. 
 
  A number of important federal environmental laws make use of VDR. For 
example, VDRs appear within the Clean Air Act in its standards for emissions from new 
versus existing stationary sources, motor vehicle and motor vehicle engines, non-road 
engines and vehicles, and commercial vehicles; within the Clean Water Act in a wide 
variety of aspects, including in effluent limits for public treatment plants; within the Safe 
Drinking Water Act; and within laws affecting the generation and disposal of hazardous 
and solid waste.
2 State and local environmental laws also make frequent use of VDRs, for 
stationary and mobile source emissions limits, and energy-efficiency standards in new 
construction, among other instances.
3 In the non-environmental realm, VDRs appear in a 
variety of occupational health and safety laws, automotive safety regulations, consumer 
product safety laws, and building codes.
4 
 
                                                           
2 See infra Table 1.  
3 For example, California has established differentiated emissions standards for new motor vehicles. See 
infra Table 1. 
4For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 seeks to assure men and women of safe 
working conditions, but some regulations under the statute exempt facilities built before specific dates. See 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2005). Likewise, many cities have 
adopted regulations from fire codes written by national technical organizations, such as the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA); some older facilities—such as dry cleaning shops—are not required to 
comply with codes that were passed after the shops began operation. Consumer product safety laws, such 
as regulations promulgated under the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 
(2005), typically control (either by design standard or outright banning) new products manufactured for 
sale, offered for sale, distributed in commerce, or imported into the United States, but do not control 
products already purchased and in use. Similarly, automotive safety regulations—such as passive passenger 
restraint requirements—affect new cars, not the entire existing stock of automobiles. And, obviously, most 
building codes—including those regulating lot size and setback requirements—affect new construction, not 
previously built structures.  See:  REDWOOD KARDON, MICHAEL CASEY, AND DOUGLAS HANSEN.  CODE 
CHECK BUILDING:  A FIELD GUIDE TO BUILDING CODES.  (2005) (providing a review of national building 
codes). 
3  4
  Why have VDRs been such a common feature of U.S. regulatory policy? As 
suggested above, proponents frequently claim that VDRs are efficient and equitable. 
Indeed, it is typically cheaper to build a new plant with required technology in the first 
place than to retrofit an older, existing plant. In terms of equity, it seems fair to avoid 
changing the rules for facilities that have already been built or for products that have 
already been manufactured. On the other hand, the claim of efficiency is based on a static 
view that ignores the perverse dynamic incentives that such a time-differentiated standard 
can put in place.
5 Such standards give firms an incentive to continue using (exempt) older 
polluting plants, rather than investing in new, more environmentally friendly plants that 
would fall under more stringent regulations. And, in terms of equity, VDRs by definition 
lack a “level playing field,” which hardly appears fair from the perspective of those 
entering the market and facing the more stringent component of an age-differentiated 
regulation.  
 
  A broader explanation for the prevalence of VDRs is fundamentally political. 
Both regulated constituents and legislators have very strong incentives to favor these 
policies.
6 First, on the regulatory demand side, some types of regulations can augment 
firms’ profits through the generation of rents
7 and erection of entry barriers. Consider a 
simple model of an industry made up of identical firms in long-run competitive 
equilibrium. If the government imposes a command-and-control standard that sets an 
allowable level of pollution for each firm, and firms can meet the standard only by 
reducing their output, the standard will lead to reduced total production and therefore an 
increase in price along the aggregate demand curve.
8 If the environmental restriction is 
not exceptionally severe, the new price will be above average cost for all firms, and firms 
will earn rents. Firms, however, are not limited to the single response of cutting output. 
They can also reduce emissions by adopting a new technology or changing their input 
mix. Yet, in this more realistic scenario, command-and-control standards can still have 
the effect of conveying rents to regulated firms, depending on the stringency of the 
standards and other factors.
9 
 
  These rents, however, are only sustainable to the extent that other participants 
cannot freely enter the market—enhanced industry profitability resulting from rents is 
sustainable only in the presence of entry restrictions.
10 In theory, such a mechanism might 
                                                           
5It is by no means impossible, however, to design a VDR that accelerates investment. The nitrous oxide 
(NOx) requirements in Titles I and IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, for example, provided an 
inducement in the form of a less ambitious standard for early adopters. See Clean Air Act Amendments, 
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).  
6 See generally, Nathaniel Keohane, Richard Revesz & Robert Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory  
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313  (1998) (developing a political 
economy model of the supply and demand for alternative environmental policy instruments).  
7 Economic rents are payments made to a factor of production—labor, land, or capital—that are in excess 
of what is required to elicit the supply of that factor. 
8 James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus  
Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139, 139-141 (1975) (setting out the basic theoretical model of how 
conventional regulations can convey rents to firms).  
9 Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 
25 J.L. & ECON. 99,105, 122 (1982).  
10 Higher than normal profits in an industry, due to rents, will encourage other firms to enter the market   5
prohibit new entry outright, but a more politically feasible approach simply imposes 
higher costs on new entrants.
11 This is precisely what VDRs do. Accordingly, private 
firms and their trade associations demand command-and-control standards that are more 
stringent for new sources. This is one important explanation for the prevalence of VDRs 
in U.S. environmental laws.  
 
  Another demand-side explanation for the prevalence of VDRs arises from the 
differential costs of environmental compliance across firms resulting from varying 
pollution abatement costs from one firm to another. Because of this heterogeneity, a firm 
may support policy instruments that impose costs on it, as long as those costs affect it less 
than the industry average and thus give it a competitive advantage.
12 One form of cost 
differential arises as a result of the erection of barriers to entry. It is important to 
distinguish here between the entry of new firms and the expansion of existing firms, but 
the entry barriers of environmental regulation generally apply to both situations. Thus, 
within an industry, firms with no plans to expand would derive a greater benefit from 
entry barriers, which could discourage further growth by their competitors. 
 
  Turning to the supply side of regulation, legislators are typically more concerned 
with the distribution of costs and benefits—in particular their geographic distribution— 
than with a comparison of total benefits and costs.
13 Politicians are likely to oppose 
instruments that may induce firms to close business in their districts and relocate 
elsewhere, leading to localized unemployment.
14 Although there will be winners as well 
as losers from such relocation, potential losers are likely to be more certain of their status, 
and thus exert greater political pressure, than potential gainers.
15 This asymmetry creates 
a bias in favor of the status quo.  
 
  For the same reason, grandfathering is likely to be a politically expedient option 
for legislators, since it allows leeway in rewarding firms and in distributing the costs and 
benefits of regulation among jurisdictions. By limiting the scope of regulation to new 
capital assets, the burden of regulatory compliance is concentrated on a small subset of 
the electorate and the cost is transferred to unspecified, future “new sources.” In addition, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
until competition drives down prices, eliminating the rents. Only at this  point will other firms cease to 
enter the market. Hence, barriers to entry are necessary for the sustainability of such rents. 
11 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3,5 (1971) (examining how the 
powers of the state can be used to assist firms through the control over entry of potential rivals); see 
generally Eric Rasmusen & Mark Zupan, Extending the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Form of 
Policy, 72 PUB. CHOICE 167 (1991). (examining how firms choose desired policies from the set including 
entry barriers, price floors, subsidies, and demand stimulation).  
12 Robert A. Leone & John E. Jackson, The Political Economy of Federal Regulatory Activity: The Case of  
Water-Pollution Controls, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 231, 247, 254, 260 (Gary Fromm ed., 1981) ; 
Sharon Oster, The Strategic Use of Regulatory Investment by Industry Sub-Groups, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 604, 
610-611 (1982).  
13 Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an 
Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 40-41 (1991).  
14 Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Environmental Markets in the Year 2000, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
351, 358 (1990).  
15 When a firm leaves an area, the “losers”—such as those losing their jobs—are easily identified, whereas 
there is considerable uncertainty regarding the “gainers,” i.e. the identification of those individuals who 
will actually succeed in getting the new jobs.   6
the costs of such regulation are less obvious when combined with major investments in 
new capital.
16 In contrast, if regulations were to require retrofits to existing capital assets, 
the costs would be vastly more transparent.
17 
 
  In summary, the prevalence of VDRs can be understood not simply through 
claims made about the efficiency and fairness of these approaches, but also through 
fundamental political forces. Demand for VDRs comes from existing firms, which seek 
to erect entry barriers to restrict competition and to protect the rents created by command-
and-control standards. Environmentalists often support strict standards for new sources 
because they represent environmental progress, at least symbolically.
18 On the supply 
side, more stringent standards for new sources allow legislators to protect existing 
constituents and interests by placing the bulk of the pollution control burden on future 
facilities. 
 
  Recognizing the ubiquity of VDRs in environmental regulation in the United 
States, I next develop an analytic framework within which these mechanisms can be 
normatively assessed. 
 
3. The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Environmental Policy Instruments 
 
  In order to assess the role of VDRs in environmental policy, it is necessary to 
identify normative criteria by which alternative policy instruments can be judged. A 
variety of normative criteria have been posited as relevant for choosing environmental 
policy instruments, including: (1) whether the policy instrument will achieve the stated 
goal or standard; (2) whether it will do so at the lowest possible cost, including both 
private-sector compliance and public-sector monitoring and enforcement; (3) whether it 
provides government with the information it needs to implement the policy; (4) whether 
the instrument will be flexible in the face of changes in tastes and technology; (5) 
whether the instrument provides dynamic incentives for research, development, and 
adoption of better pollution-abatement technologies; (6) whether the implementation of 
the policy instrument will result in an equitable distribution of the benefits and costs of 
environmental protection; and (7) whether the policy will be politically feasible in terms 
of enactment and implementation.
19 Items (1) through (5) together refer to a 
comprehensive description of the criterion of cost-effectiveness, while item (6) refers to 
                                                           
16 See Keohane, Revesz, & Stavins, supra note 6 at 359, 364.  
17 In the context of automobile emissions regulation, Robert W. Crandall and his co-authors noted that 
“owners of existing equipment can organize to fight regulation that adversely affects their interests. For 
instance, California automobile owners successfully fought retrofit requirements in the 1960s. In contrast, 
future purchasers of new equipment do not constitute as cohesive an interest group; therefore regulation 
tends to be focused upon new vehicles.” ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 89 
(1986).  
18 See Keohane, Revesz, & Stavins, supra note 6 at 354-56.  
19See Peter Bohm & Clifford F. Russell, Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY ECONOMICS 395, 399-402 (Allen V. Kneese & James 
L. Sweeney eds., 1985) (proposing a list of criteria for environmental regulations). For further details, see 
Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Law and Policy, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.) (forthcoming 2005).    7
distributional equity, and item (7) refers to political feasibility.
20 This section focuses on 
the cost-effectiveness criterion. 
 
  Cost-effectiveness refers to the allocation of pollution control requirements 
among sources which results in an aggregate pollution target being achieved at the lowest 
possible cost. It is well known that the necessary condition for cost-effectiveness is that 
all sources (that exercise some degree of control) experience the same marginal 
abatement costs.
21 Recall that the marginal costs of pollution control are the additional or 
incremental costs of achieving an additional unit of pollution reduction. If these marginal 
costs of control are not equal across sources, then the same aggregate level of pollution 
control could be achieved at lower overall cost simply by reallocating the pollution 
control burden among sources so that the low-cost sources controlled proportionately 
more pollution and the high-cost sources controlled proportionately less. Additional 
savings could theoretically be achieved through such reallocations until marginal costs 
were identical at all sources. Thus, when examining alternative types of environmental 
policy instruments, a key question is whether particular instruments are likely to result in 
marginal abatement costs being equated across sources—the point at which they are cost-
effective.  
 
  The most frequently employed division of environmental policy instruments is 
between command-and-control versus market-based approaches. Conventional 
approaches to regulating the environment—frequently characterized as command-and-
control
22—allow relatively little flexibility in the means of achieving goals. Such policy 
instruments tend to force firms to take on similar shares of the pollution-control burden, 
regardless of the cost, sometimes by setting uniform standards for firms, the most 
prevalent of which are technology- and performance-based standards.
23 
 
  Market-based instruments, including pollution charges, tradeable permits, market-
friction reductions, and government subsidy reductions, encourage behavior through 
market signals, rather than through explicit directives regarding pollution control levels 
or methods.
24 These policy instruments can be described as “harnessing market forces,”
25 
                                                           
20 See Bohm & Russell, supra note 19.  
21 W ILLIAM  J. BAUMOL  & WALLACE  E. OATES, THE  THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY 165-67 
(Cambridge University Press 1988) (1975).  
22The phrase “command-and-control” is by far the most commonly employed characterization for 
conventional environmental policy instruments, including uniform performance and technology standards. 
Admittedly, the phrase has an inescapable negative stigma associated with it, and so a better, more neutral 
description of this category of policy approaches might be “prescriptive instruments.” Nonetheless, 
“command-and-control” is the generally accepted name for this category.  
23 Note that uniform standards can specify the amount of pollution that can be released into the 
environment (an emission standard) or the permissible concentration of pollution in the air, water, or soil 
(an ambient standard). The cost-effective allocation consistent with ambient standards requires equalization 
of the marginal costs to reduce a unit of ambient concentration, rather than emission. 
24See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 13, at 7-15. See also Robert N. Stavins, Experience with Market-Based 
Environmental Policy Instruments, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 355, 360-61 
(K.G. Mäler & J. Vincent, eds., Elsevier 2003). Liability rules can also be thought of as a market-based 
instrument, because they provide incentives for firms to take into account the potential environmental 
damages of their decisions, allowing full flexibility in technology and control practices. See generally, 
RICHARD L. REVESZ, FOUNDATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1997) (considering liability   8
because, when well designed and properly implemented, they encourage firms or 
individuals to undertake pollution control efforts through generation of an economic 
interest in compliance. 
 
  Where there is significant heterogeneity of costs, holding all firms to the same 
target will be unduly expensive, and command-and-control methods will not be cost-
effective. Real world control costs can vary enormously due to production design, 
physical configuration, age of assets, and other factors. Indeed, abatement cost 
heterogeneity is a ubiquitous and important characteristic of many environmental 
problems.
26 The cost of controlling a unit of a given pollutant may vary by a factor of 100 
or more among sources.
27 This heterogeneity argues for the use of market-based 
instruments in many cases. 
 
  If properly designed and implemented, market-based instruments can allow any 
desired level of pollution cleanup to be realized at the lowest overall cost to society, by 
providing the incentives for the greatest reductions in pollution to those firms that can 
achieve the reductions most cheaply. Rather than equalizing pollution levels among 
firms, market-based instruments have the effect of encouraging firms to equalize their 
marginal abatement costs.
28 Command-and-control approaches could, in theory, achieve 
this cost-effective solution, but this would require that different standards be set for each 
pollution source, and, consequently, that policy makers obtain detailed information about 
the compliance costs each firm faces. Such information, which is privately generated by 
firms when it is known at all, is simply not available to government. Thus, potentially 
cost-effective, non-uniform performance standards are generally considered to be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rules among other market-based instruments). Other taxonomies of regulatory instruments are possible, and 
some take a more inclusive view, including, for example, contractual approaches. On this, see generally 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Peter S. Menell, ed., 2002) (including contractual approaches as a category of 
environmental policy instruments).  
25See generally J.B. OPSCHOOR  & HANS  B. VOS, ECONOMIC  INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION (Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev. 1989) (surveying economics-based environmental policy 
instruments); ECON. INCENTIVES  TASK  FORCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUB. NO. 21P-2001, 
ECONOMIC  INCENTIVES: OPTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION  (1991) (discussing economic 
incentives in solid waste, climate change, and water resources contexts),; ALAN CARLIN, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, PUB. NO. EPA-230-R-92-001, THE  UNITED  STATES  EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC 
INCENTIVES TO CONTROL ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION (1992) (for early assessments of the use of market-
based instruments in environmental policy).  
26 TOM H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 16, 42-43 
(1985) (describing heterogeneity in abatement costs).  
27 For numerical examples of the heterogeneity of incremental costs of pollution control, see Robert W. 
Crandall,  The Political Economy of Clean Air: Practical Constraints on White House Review,  in 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN’S EXECUTIVE ORDER: THE ROLE OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
205, 210-15 (V. Smith ed. 1984). But where costs are similar among sources, command-and-control 
instruments may perform equivalently to (or better than) market-based instruments, depending on 
transactions costs, administrative costs, possibilities for strategic behavior, political costs, and the nature of 
the pollutants. See generally Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential 
Savings from Market-Based Policies, 23 J. REG. ECON. 43 (2003) (analyzing the effects of abatement cost 
heterogeneity on the magnitude of aggregate abatement costs).  
28 David W. Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. ECON. 
THEORY 395, 400-01 (1972); Baumol & Oates, supra note 21, at 168, 182.  
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infeasible, both because of the asymmetric information problem identified above and 
because unequal standards would raise questions of fairness among policy makers. 
 
  If the government has reason to believe that abatement costs are highly correlated 
with the (more easily observed) vintage of sources, despite the fact that it cannot observe 
source-specific abatement costs, then an appropriately-designed vintage differentiated 
regulation could theoretically serve as an approximation of a cost-effective, non-uniform 
standard. The quality of that approximation would depend, of course, on the degree of 
correlation of abatement costs with the VDR’s quantitative pollution standards. Given 
that abatement cost heterogeneity is typically distributed continuously and as a function 
of many factors, it is unlikely that a simple, unidimensional and dichotomous VDR 
would serve as a good approximation.
29 Nevertheless, this is an empirical question.
30 
 
  Even if a VDR were perfectly correlated with underlying abatement cost 
heterogeneity, and therefore cost-effective in the short term, such an instrument, like any 
non-uniform performance standard, would still fail to provide dynamic incentives for 
sources to adopt cheaper and better pollution-control technologies over time. With 
market-based instruments, most clearly with emission taxes, firms benefit by cleaning up 
a bit more than is required if a sufficiently low-cost method (technology or process) of 
doing so can be identified and adopted.
31 
 
  Furthermore, VDRs, unlike market-based instruments, and indeed unlike ordinary 
non-uniform standards, present another problem: an environmentally negative dynamic 
incentive for regulated firms to extend the useful lives of their plant and equipment, 
thereby reducing cost-effectiveness and possibly retarding environmental progress. This 
issue—the effect of VDRs on investment and maintenance decisions, and the 
implications for abatement costs and environmental performance—is the focus of the 
remainder of this article. 
 
                                                           
29This assessment of the potential static cost-effectiveness of VDRs is specific to the realm of pollution 
abatement, for the reasons given above. For an analysis of the economic implications of a much broader 
class of policies, of which VDRs are only one category, and environmental VDRs a still smaller subset, see 
generally Steven Shavell, Optimal Legal Change When Adjustment to Legal Change is Costly (Harvard 
Law School, Working Paper, 2005) (on file with author). The key previous work along those lines is by 
Louis Kaplow. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 
582-92 (1986); Louis Kaplow, Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action, 94 
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 525, 534-35 (1992).  
30The existing theoretical and empirical literature on environmental VDRs (surveyed in subsequent sections 
of this paper) gives very little attention to the potential static cost-effectiveness of VDRs as dichotomous 
approximations to unobservable continuous distributions of abatement-cost heterogeneity. Rather, this 
possibility seems to be taken for granted, a reality that was brought home to me by Shavell,  supra note 29. 
31 Paul B. Downing & Lawrence J. White, Innovation in Pollution Control, 13 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 
18, 21-22 (1986); Scott R. Milliman & Ronald Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological Change 
in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247, 257-58 (1989); Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. 
Stavins, Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments 
on Technology Diffusion, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S43, S45-46 (1995).  
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4. Impacts Theory of Vintage-Differentiated Regulation 
 
  The core theory of the effects of vintage-differentiated regulation on the lives of 
durable plant and equipment comes from the general theory of the determinants of the 
age of capital.
32 Consider a simple model in which a firm’s production decision can be 
characterized by the choice of two variables: the number of pieces of durable equipment 
to be operated and the lives of each of these devices. Inevitably, these pieces of durable 
equipment (for example, machines) degrade over time. In other words, maintenance costs 
rise as the machines age. If competitive firms seek to maximize their profits, they will 
place new machines in service if and only if the present discounted value of the expected 
future net revenue per machine (revenue from its use minus maintenance costs) exceeds a 
new machine’s initial cost. This theory leads to the intuitive profit-maximizing rule that 
machines should be run until maintenance costs equal net revenues.  
 
  The impacts of vintage-differentiated environmental regulation can be understood 
with this simple model of capital replacement. VDR endows old machines with a value 
that cannot be transferred, since new machines are rendered systematically more costly 
due to more stringent regulation. The effective price of new capital is increased, and old 
capital is accordingly retired at a later date. Hence, the average age of capital increases 
and the rate of investment decreases.
33 
 
  A more specialized model, with explicit representations of product and pollutant 
output
34 reinforces the finding that the systematic bias against new sources in VDR has 
the effect of retarding the rate of turnover of the capital stock. Pollution abatement costs 
are therefore higher under a VDR scheme than under an equivalent undifferentiated 
regulation scheme. Strikingly, the relationship between aggregate pollutant emissions and 
regulatory stringency can be perverse, with more stringent regulation leading to increased 
aggregate emissions. This can occur when VDR is applied to technologies in which 
newer vintages have lower pollutant emissions (even in the absence of the vintage 
differentiated regulation).
35 Requiring pollution control technologies only for new 
                                                           
32 Robert N. Stavins, The Effects of Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 2005 AEI-
BROOKINGS JOINT CTR.  FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, Related Pub. 05-03, 4 (explicating a mathematical 
model of differentiated regulation); see also Michael T. Maloney & Gordon L. Brady, Capital Turnover 
and Marketable Pollution Rights, 31 J.L. & ECON 203, 207-09 (1988) (describing a simpler model that this 
article employs); see generally Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Social Regulation in Theory and 
Practice (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (providing a detailed theoretical model of 
differentiated regulation). 
33A more complex model would also allow for endogenous maintenance. As is discussed in sections 5 and 
6 below, VDRs create incentives to extend the useful lives of equipment in two ways: first, by keeping it 
longer (as in the model above), and second by investing more in maintenance throughout the life of the 
equipment than would otherwise be the case. The latter incentive reinforces the capital investment effect 
examined above. For a general discussion of endogenous maintenance, see Nathaniel Keohane et al., 
Controlling Stocks and Flows to Promote Quality: The Environment, with Applications to Physical and 
Human Capital (NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 31-36, Working Paper No. 7727, 2000) (discussing 
optimal maintenance of physical capital).  
34 See generally Gruenspecht, supra note 32. (describing and using such a model). 
35 These effects are heightened, of course, if the older technology in question exhibits increasing emissions 
(degraded abatement) as it ages.   11
sources forces a choice between continuing to operate older, uncontrolled equipment and 
adopting new, cleaner equipment with the additional expense of a pollution control 
technology. Such conditions are typical in the environmental regulatory sphere.
36 Thus, 
increasing the stringency of a VDR can drive up costs and simultaneously drive down 
benefits (by increasing emissions due to the continued use of old equipment without 
emission control). 
 
  In summary, VDRs can have significant impacts on decisions regarding capital 
investment. A regulatory bias against new sources will reduce investment in new 
facilities and lengthen the economic lives of existing facilities. Most remarkable, more 
stringent VDRs can, at least in the short-term, be environmentally counter-productive, 
increasing the aggregate emissions level, rather than reducing it, if they discourage the 
use of cleaner new technology strongly enough.
37 Granted, in theory, a more stringent 
VDR would lead ultimately to lower aggregate emissions as the older, retained vintage of 
equipment is retired. Nevertheless, the perverse effects on investment can lead to short-
term emissions increases. 
 
  A key question is, therefore, how long the “short-term” will be. If the short-term 
is truly short, perverse effects of VDRs will be minimized. However, the trade-off 
between short-term and long-term effects becomes problematic when the sources subject 
to regulation have especially low rates of deterioration and technical obsolescence–
conditions which are met by power plants, for example. In this case, the “short-term” is 
very long, on the scale of decades, and vintage-differentiated regulations are likely to be 
particularly problematic. It is an empirical question, however, as to whether the extreme, 
counter-productive outcome actually occurs in any given case. I examine empirical 
evidence of the effects of VDRs in the auto industry (where turnover might be expected 
to be relatively high) and in the power generation industry (where turnover is very low) 
in parts 5 and 6, below. 
 
5. Vintage-Differentiated Regulation in the U.S. Auto Industry 
 
Vintage differentiation has been a prominent feature of U.S. motor vehicle 
regulation, including automobile emissions standards under the Clean Air Act, 
automotive safety standards under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 
(1966), and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards under the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act amendments (1975).
38 In all three cases, more stringent 
standards apply to vehicles of later vintages. Research in this area suggests the following. 
                                                           
36 As market forces push technological developments to reduce economic waste, the result can be more 
efficient use of energy, fewer discharges, and so on. Hence, in the environmental realm, it is frequently the 
case that new generations of technologies exhibit lower pollutant emissions (even in the absence of vintage 
differentiated regulations intended to bring down emissions over time). 
37 Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: The Case of Auto Emissions Standards, 72 AM.  
ECON. REV. 328, 328 (1982).  
38Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 865, (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7661) (1977) ; 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431); Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 
871 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 6231-6247) (1975).   12
First, VDRs have extended the useful lives of cars on the road, and therefore   
theoretically may have increased aggregate emissions.
39 But empirical analyses 
addressing whether motor vehicles—with their relatively rapid rate of turnover—have 
actually exhibited counter-productive emissions increases due to VDRs has been less 
clear cut. Whereas cost-effectiveness was certainly compromised, impacts on aggregate 
emissions appear to have been small (although statistically significant) and temporary.
40 
Furthermore, the costs of retrofitting motor vehicles for pollution control or fuel 
efficiency are typically prohibitive (less so for some safety standards),
41 and so in this 
realm the simple replacement of VDRs with undifferentiated regulation (that is, 
elimination of grandfathering) is not an attractive or even feasible alternative. Rather, a 
number of alternative regulatory strategies may hold some promise.
42 
 
5.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Effects of Automobile VDR 
 
  In general terms, the anticipated effects of automobile VDR are linked with a 
retirement decision regarding a durable good. With well-functioning markets for both 
new and used cars, it is reasonable to anticipate that (on average) cars will be scrapped if 




  Since new and used cars are substitutes for each other, any increase in the price or 
operating costs of new cars causes substitution of used cars, increasing demand in that 
relatively inelastic
44 market and thereby driving up the price of used cars. The result is 
that the economic lives of used cars are extended, scrapping rates fall, and there are more 
cars of the older vintage on the road.
45 Since the emissions of older vintages of cars are 
generally greater than those of newer vintages of cars, the delay in retiring vehicles could 
result in counter-productive increases in aggregate emissions. Again, whether such 
emission increases actually occur is an empirical question; two of the key variables 
required to answer it are the price elasticities of scrappage and of new vehicle sales.
46  
 
                                                           
39 See notes 52-55 infra, and accompanying text. 
40 See notes 52-54 infra, and accompanying text. 
41 See Crandall et al., supra note 17, at 89. 
42 See section 7, infra. 
43 See Gruenspecht, supra note 37 at 328. For further details on the underlying mathematical model, see 
Stavins, supra note 32.  
44 Elasticity of demand refers to the responsiveness of demand to changes in price. An inelastic market is 
one in which a one percent change in price leads to less than a one percent change in quantity demanded. 
45 See Gruenspecht, supra note 37 at 328. 
46 Researchers have conducted theoretical and empirical investigations of “accelerated vehicle retirement 
programs” as a means of reducing aggregate pollutant emissions by increasing the rate of turnover of the 
automobile fleet . See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn, An Economic Analysis of Scrappage, 26 RAND J. ECON. 222, 
238-40 (1995) (examining the impact of policies aimed at encouraging the retirement of older, high-
polluting vehicles) ; see generally Anna Alberini et al., Determinants of Participation in Accelerated 
Vehicle-Retirement Programs, 26 RAND J. ECON. 93 (1995) (presenting an empirical analysis of the factors 
affecting participation in accelerated vehicle-retirement programs).    13
In a comprehensive assessment of automotive regulation, Crandall et al. raised 
three primary concerns.
47 First, because VDR increases the price of new cars, it affects 
the used car market (as outlined above) and provides incentives to extend the useful lives 
of automobiles. Such extensions can “partially or fully offset the direct emissions-
reducing impact of tighter standards for a considerable period.”
48 Second, since VDR 
establishes a direct link between the rate of fleet turnover and environmental 
performance, when new car sales fall below expectations environmental progress can be 
compromised.
49 Third, VDRs for automobiles provide no incentives for individual car 




5.2 Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Automobile VDR 
 
Analyzing the effects of motor vehicle VDRs provides an opportunity to test a 
centrally important empirical question: do VDRs have counter-productive effects on 
aggregate emissions even when applied to a durable good with a relatively rapid rate of 
capital turnover? To investigate this, Gruenspecht estimated the key demand elasticities 
of scrappage and new vehicle sales  from empirical data and combined these with an 
independent estimate of the cost penalty associated with the 1981 new car emissions 
standards for carbon monoxide (CO) and nitrogen oxides (NOx).
51 This enabled him to 
calculate the effect of the adoption of the more stringent new car standards on auto 
scrappage rates and then estimate the net effects of the VDR on aggregate emissions. 
 
  Gruenspecht found that the VDR had depressed new car sales by between 2% and 
4% over the first five years after the regulation came into force.
52 As a result, CO 
emissions were actually increased by the regulation by approximately 1% per year over 
the first four years before declining in year five. Hydrocarbon emissions were increased 
up to 2% per year over the first five years before declining in year six, while NOx 
emissions were uniformly decreased by regulation. Of course, the CO and hydrocarbon 
effects were short term. Six years after the regulation had come into effect, emissions of 
all three pollutants had declined.
53 By the end of 1990, the level of emissions had fallen 
5.3% below baseline for CO and 16% below baseline for HCs.
54 Thus, counter-
productive environmental performance was a temporary phenomenon.
55 Nevertheless, by 
                                                           
47 See CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 17 at 89-90. In an earlier theoretical study, Kwoka demonstrated that 
CAFE alters the mix and total number of vehicles in the fleet in ways that could “partially or even fully 
offset the fuel savings envisioned by a rising CAFE.” John E. Kwoka Jr., The Limits of Market-Oriented 
Regulatory Techniques: The Case of Automotive Fuel Economy. 98 Q. J. ECON 695, 696 (1983 
48 CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 17, at 89.  
49 CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 17, at 89-90.  
50 CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 17 at 90.  
51 See generally Gruenspecht, supra note 37 (for details of his analysis).  
52 Gruenspecht, supra note 37, at 330.  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55Id at 330-31. The long-term favorable effects on emissions of the retirement of older vehicles when new 
car emissions standards become more stringent are documented by Matthew E. Kahn, New Evidence on 
Trends in Vehicle Emissions, 27 RAND J. OR ECON. 183, 194-95 (1996).    14
delaying turnover in the vehicle fleet, the VDR did not reduce emissions as quickly as the 
legislative standards would suggest
56 and the cost-effectiveness of the policy was 
reduced.  
 
  A few authors have contrasted the vintage-differentiated regulations in motor 
vehicle emissions laws and the VDR-based Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards
57 with alternative approaches. For example, Gruenspecht considered a $250 
“bounty” for scrapping 15-year old cars,
58 for which he predicted an environmental 
performance better than either the actual VDR or the absence of it. Similarly, Crandall 
contrasted the CAFE program with commensurate gasoline taxes; Crandall found CAFE 
to be the more costly regulatory option for improving fuel economy.
59 This comparison 
goes well beyond VDRs, of course: there are other reasons why CAFE standards are a 
relatively costly means of achieving fuel conservation in addition to the component of 
CAFE that features vintage differentiation.
60 Nevertheless, it should be noted that CAFE 
adds to the cost of new vehicles, thereby reducing new car sales and extending the life of 
old vehicles while having no fuel-use reducing effects on old vehicles. This contrasts 
with a gasoline tax, which increases the marginal cost of driving for all vehicles while 
simultaneously inducing car owners to trade in old fuel-inefficient cars for newer, more 
fuel-efficient ones by increasing the cost of operation of older cars.
61 
 
                                                           
56 CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 17, at 91-97.  
57 The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 established fuel efficiency standards for automobiles 
and light trucks, requiring manufacturers to meet minimum sales-weighted average fuel efficiency for their 
fleets sold in the United States. A penalty is charged per car sold per unit of average fuel efficiency below 
the standard. The program operates like an intra-firm tradeable permit system, since manufacturers can 
undertake efficiency improvements wherever they are cheapest within their fleets. Light trucks, which are 
defined by the Federal government to include “sport utility vehicles,” face weaker CAFE standards. 
58 Gruenspecht, supra note 37, at 329-330.  
59 Robert W. Crandall, Policy Watch: Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 6  J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 171, 175-79 (1992).  
60For varying assessments of the CAFE program’s costs relative to equivalent gasoline taxes, see generally 
CRANDALL ET AL. (1986), supra note 17; Pinelopi K. Goldberg, The Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel 
Efficiency Standards (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5673, 1997) (finding a 780% 
increase in gas tax would be required to make the emissions reductions gains reached through CAFE) 
National Research Council, Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
Standards (The National Academies Press 2002) (finding fuel tax to be a superior alternative to CAFE); Ian 
W. Parry et al., Should Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards be Tightened? (Resources for 
the Future, Discussion Paper 04-53, 2004) (discussing factors affecting efficacy of higher CAFE 
standards). 
61 How strong have these effects, which result both from CAFE’s VDR component and its other aspects, 
been? Estimates of the welfare costs of CAFE range from $0.41 to $0.63 per gallon of gasoline conserved, 
compared with welfare costs of $0.08 per gallon conserved for a 2.4 cents per gallon tax, indicating a five 
to eight-fold cost differential  See Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, The Effect of Fuel Economy 
Standards on Automobile Safety,32 J. L. & ECON. 97, 115-18 (1989); David L. Greene, CAFE or Price?: 
An Analysis of the Effects of Federal Fuel Economy Regulations and Gasoline Price on New Car MPG, 
1978-89, 11 ENERGY J. 37 (1990) Andrew N. Kleit, The Effect of Annual Changes in Automobile Fuel 
Efficiency Standards, 2 J. REG. ECON. 151, 164 (1990). Not too much should be made of this comparison, 
however, since the CAFE program is much more stringent than a 2.4 cent per gallon gasoline tax. If the 
marginal costs of fuel efficiency increase over the relevant domain, which is the case, then on this basis 
alone, one would anticipate some cost differential.   15
  The perverse incentives of VDRs also arose in the context of the California Air 
Resources Board’s 1990 requirement that automobile manufacturers include zero-
emissions vehicles
62 (ZEVs) in their 1998 California sales mix.
63 Although the 
requirement would have slightly reduced emissions from the average new car sold in the 
state, the program would also have had the effect of increasing prices of both electric 
(ZEV) and non-electric vehicles, as manufacturers spread the costs of developing the 
ZEVs and the subsidies needed to induce consumers to buy them. Gruenspecht found that 
new car purchases would consequently fall by 2% to 3%, commensurate with an increase 
in the retention of less efficient older cars in the fleet.
64 Gruenspecht’s analysis indicates 
that the extra emissions thereby generated would more than offset the emissions 
reductions from the ZEVs.  
 
Have VDRs had counter-productive effects on aggregate emissions in the 
automotive sector, despite the relatively rapid rate of capital turnover that characterizes 
this realm? It appears clear from the existing body of research—both theoretical and 
empirical—that VDRs have extended the useful lives of cars on the road, and therefore 
can increase aggregate emissions. Empirical analysis addressing whether motor vehicles 
have exhibited counter-productive emissions increases due to VDRs indicates that, as 
would be expected, these impacts have been temporary and relatively short term. 
Nevertheless, cost-effectiveness was compromised. But because the costs of retrofitting 
motor vehicles for pollution control or fuel efficiency would be prohibitive, the simple 
replacement of VDRs with undifferentiated regulation is not an attractive or even feasible 
alternative in the automotive realm. Rather, alternative regulatory approaches merit 
ongoing exploration, a topic to which I return in section 7 of this article. 
 
6. New Source Review 
 
The Clean Air Act’s New Source Review (NSR) program is a widely studied 
example of vintage-differentiated regulation, particularly as it relates to the coal-fired 
electricity generation sector.
65 This is an important and controversial application of VDRs 
                                                           
62 Zero Emissions Vehicles (ZEVs) are those certified to meet the most stringent emission standards 
established by the California Air Resources Board, which require zero regulated emissions of nonmethane 
organic gases, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides. For a summary of California’s ZEV regulations, 
including links to regulations for each model year, SEE California Air Resources Board, Zero Emissions 
Vehicle Legal and Regulatory Activities (2005),  
http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/zevprog/zevregs/zevregs.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) (on file with 
author). A ZEV is most likely powered by electricity, fuel cells, or hydrogen. 
63 For historical and current requirements and methods of compliance, see: California Air Resources Board. 
Memorandum from Alan Lloyd, Chairman, regarding “Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Credit Reporting and 
Tracking System.” Manufacturers Advisory Correspondence (MAC) 2004-01,  
www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/macs/mac0401/mac0401.pdf, March 24, 2004 (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) (on file 
with author).  
64 Howard K. Gruenspecht, Zero Emission Vehicles: A Dirty Little Secret, 142 RESOURCES 7, 8 (2001).  
65In 2003, the Bush administration initiated changes in the New Source Review program. The research 
considered in this paper deals with the program prior to those changes. The basic requirements of the NSR 
program were established in Parts C and D of Title I of the Clean Air Act. A series of regulatory changes in 
NSR, not analyzed in this article, are detailed at: EPA New Source Review Regulatory Actions, 
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/actions.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2005) (on file with author).    16
in U.S. environmental policy, and it contrasts with the automotive sector because of the 
longer life of the relevant capital. NSR sets technology-based emissions control 
requirements for new sources and for sources that are being expanded or modified 
significantly. The regulations thereby exclude existing facilities from emissions control 
requirements, essentially requiring new or upgraded power plants and some other types 
of facilities to be cleaner than old ones.
66 Because of the incentives this creates to extend 
the life of older plants rather than build new, more stringently-regulated, facilities, 
concern exists that NSR wastes resources and can retard environmental progress.
67  
 
  The NSR program applies to any new source whose potential emissions at full 
utilization are high enough to qualify it as a major source.
68 The program also applies to 
any modification at an existing major source resulting in an emissions increase.
  In 
addition to securing a permit prior to commencing construction or modification, sources 




  The NSR requirements under the Clean Air Act date back to the 1970s. Those 
who wrote the Act presumably thought they could secure greater environmental progress 
by imposing tougher emissions standards on new power plants (and certain other 
emission sources) than on old ones. The frequently-voiced theory was that emissions 
would fall as old plants were retired and replaced by new, cleaner plants.
70 Critics claim 
that experience over the past 25 years has shown this approach to be both excessively 
costly and environmentally counterproductive, because firms have been motivated to 
keep old (and dirty) plants operating and to hold back on investments in new (and 
cleaner) power generation technologies. 
 
                                                           
66 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (B)(1)(b) (2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (D)(1) (2005) (establishing standards for 
existing sources); see generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Document No. II-A-01, NSR  90-DAY 
REVIEW BACKGROUND PAPER (2001) available at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/nsr-review.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2005) (on file with author).  
67 See, e.g., Howard K. Gruenspecht & Robert N. Stavins, Op-Ed., A Level Field on Pollution at Power 
Plants, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2002 at A15; Howard K. Gruenspecht & Robert N. Stavins, New Source 
Review Under the Clean Air Act: Ripe for Reform, 147 RESOURCES 19, 19 (2002) [hereinafter Gruenspecht 
and Stavins, New Source Review].  
68 The cut-off value used to determine whether a source is major generally varies between 10 and 100 tons 
of emissions per year, depending on the source category and the severity of any air quality problem where 
the source is located. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, note 66 supra, at 3. 
69 NSR sources located in areas that do not meet national ambient air quality standards are also required to 
secure offsets for their emissions. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, note 66 supra, at 5. 
70For a historical perspective on the development of the 1971 and 1979 new source standards, see generally 
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981). For an early assessment 
of the effects of the regulations, see generally Frank M. Gollop & Mark J. Roberts, Environmental 
Regulations and Productivity Growth: The Case of Fossil-fueled Electric Power Generation, 91 J. POL. 
ECON. 654 (1983).    17
6.1 NSR and New Power Plants 
 
In theory, NSR can create perverse environmental incentives, especially when 
major technology advances make new plants much cleaner than old ones. Several studies 
have empirically examined the hypothesis that NSR in the electricity generation sector 
has extended the useful lives of existing plants and delayed the construction of 
replacement capacity, thereby having a perverse effect on emissions abatement. 
 
  One study examined the relationships between regulation and capital turnover, 
and capital age and emissions.
71 In research carried out across time and across firms, the 
researchers found a statistically significant inverse relationship between the rate of new 
plant investment and the presence of air quality regulation, controlling for other relevant 
variables. In other words, increased air quality regulation was correlated with decreased 
new plant investment even when allowing for the effects of other factors. The authors 
conclude that “these results convince us that regulation has induced delay in the 




  A second study, working with different data, provided partial validation of the 
presence of a regulatory-induced lengthening of the life of capital, finding that “increases 
in regulatory intensity lead firms to delay the construction of new steam-generating 
plants.”
73 In this case, the researchers found that over the period from 1969 to 1983 
environmental regulations increased plant age by more than twenty-two percent.
74 
However, for the most part, the study did not find a significant effect of plant age on 
emissions.
75 The reason for this may be found in an earlier study by Joskow and 
Schmalensee, which noted that fuel efficiency in coal-fired plants improved throughout 
the 1960s, but stabilized in the 1970s (and may even have declined for some new units).
76 
If fuel efficiency was related to emissions, then older plants may not have been more 
polluting than newer ones during that period. 
 
  A much more recent analysis by Swift illustrates how NSR requirements can 
impede the adoption of cleaner and more efficient energy technologies, such as combined 
                                                           
71See generally Maloney & Brady, supra note 32.  
72Id. at 222. In particular, Maloney & Brady found that in the ten states with the greatest regulatory 
expenditures, the regulation-induced component of capital longevity was approximately 8 years (of an 
average longevity of 33 years), and emissions rates were elevated 27 percent because of the impacts of 
regulation on the age of capital. See also Randy A. Nelson, Regulation, Capital Vintage and Technical 
Change in the Electric Utility Industry, 66 REV. ECON. & STAT. 59, 66 (1984). 
73Randy A. Nelson, Tom Tietenberg, & Michael R. Donihue, Differential Environmental Regulation: 
Effects on Electric Utility Capital Turnover and Emissions, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 368, 371 (1993).  
74 Id. at 373.  
75 Id.   
76 Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Performance of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Units in 
the United States: 1960-1980, 2 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 85, 107 (1987)   18
heat and power (CHP) systems.
77 Swift found that NSR rules pose a deterrent to the 
spread of CHP technology, although it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the 
regulation’s technology-standard approach from the effects of the regulation’s NSR 
component per se.
78 In any event, the rules require the application of end-of-pipe control 
technology to an already clean turbine with very low emissions.
79 This requirement can 
significantly increase the cost of a CHP project and removes only a small amount of 
pollution, resulting in a very high cost-per-ton of removal, more than $25,000 by Swift’s 
estimate for the most modern plants, or twenty-five to seventy-five times the cost of 
emissions reductions available from existing sources.
80 
 
  In addition to delaying capital stock turnover, NSR can promote environmentally 
perverse decisions regarding the use of new capacity. NSR can change the operating costs 
of plants of various vintages in ways that theoretically provide incentives for companies 
to favor the utilization of older plants over newer ones fitted with more effective 
emissions control technologies. For example, new coal-fired power plants built following 
passage of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments were essentially required to install 
scrubbers to remove sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions.  But the “costs of running scrubbers 
were high enough that new coal-fired plants were more expensive to operate than many 
existing ones, which were not regulated under a new source standard.” 
81 “Under these 
conditions, utilities might be expected to reduce output from their new, scrubbed units 
while operating older plants at full capacity during off-peak seasons and time periods.”
82  
 
  These effects were validated empirically in an econometric analysis by Stanton, 
which found that plants with laxer environmental requirements were utilized more 
intensely.
83 Thus, by reversing the usual preference for maximizing use of modern plants, 
vintage-differentiated regulation of SO2 emissions under the Clean Air Act reduced the 
environmental benefits resulting from the mandated investment in expensive scrubbing 
equipment.
84  
                                                           
77In a modern CHP system, fuel is burned in a turbine to generate electricity, and the waste heat from 
combustion, which in conventional stand-alone generation systems is vented to the atmosphere, is used in 
commercial or industrial processes at the site. A new CHP installation using a gas-fired turbine with low-
nitrogen oxide burners and no end–of–pipe emissions controls substantially reduces nitrogen oxide 
emissions from levels that would result from the continued operation of an existing onsite boiler to provide 
process heat and an offsite power plant to provide power. CHP also allows for a substantial reduction in the 
total primary energy input required to meet heat and power needs, yielding economic benefits and lower 
carbon dioxide emissions. See generally, Byron Swift, Grandfathering, New Source Review and NOx - 
Making Sense of a Flawed System, 31 BUREAU NAT’L AFF. ENV’T REP. 1538 (2000). (describing CHP 
systems and assessing the impacts of NSR)  
78 See Swift, supra note 77, at 1539-42.]  
79 Id. at 1541.  
80 Id. at 1539, 1542.  
81 Id..  
82 Id. at 21. 
83 Timothy J. Stanton, Capacity Utilization and New Source Bias: Evidence from the U.S. Electric Power 
Industry, 15 ENERGY ECON. 57, 58-60 (1993). (examining statistically the relationship between operating 
costs at U.S. electric power plants and utilization rates).  
84 The SO2 allowance trading program, implemented in 1995 under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, overcame these inefficiencies in SO2 regulation associated with NSR-type programs. See Byron   19
 
6.2 NSR and Existing Power Plants 
 
  NSR applies to existing plants only if they carry out a major modification which 
results in a net increase in emissions.
85 This approach—which at first may sound 
perfectly reasonable—has several problems.
86 First, old plants typically emit the vast 
majority of total pollution in any sector,
87 but NSR does not provide a continuous and 
effective incentive for emissions reductions at these plants. As a result, many of the most 
cost-effective emissions reduction opportunities are simply left untouched.
88 Second, 
because the lengthy and costly NSR process is triggered by “modifications,” the NSR 
program provides a powerful disincentive for improvements and efficiency upgrades at 
old plants.
89 Since adjusting existing equipment to perform more efficiently can be a 
source of pollution reductions as well as cost savings, this effect of NSR can be both 
economically and environmentally harmful.  
 
  Finally, NSR creates an uncertain regulatory environment with potentially high 
transaction costs.
90 NSR may discourage companies from maintaining their existing 
facilities. Plant owners contemplating maintenance activities must weigh the possible loss 
of considerable regulatory advantage if the work crosses the murky line between upkeep 
and improvement.
91 Protracted, costly, and time-consuming legal wrangling is inevitable 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of 
Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 390-91 (2001).  
85 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, note 66 supra, at 3-5.  
86See Gruenspecht & Stavins, New Source Review, supra note 67, at 21-22. 
87See id., supra note 67, at 21. 
88Id. 
89The finding of a major modification inevitably raises tricky issues in situations where changes are made 
to an existing plant. The combination of delay costs, control technology costs, and the costs of emissions 
offsets create a powerful incentive for existing sources to avoid triggering NSR. Existing plants can avoid 
triggering NSR requirements by demonstrating that a modification, even if major, does not increase 
emissions. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, note 66 supra, at 3-5. For steam-electric generating units, 
actual emissions before the change are compared with projected emissions after the change to determine 
whether a modification increases emissions. See 57 Fed. Reg. 32314 (July 21, 1992). Modifications that 
allow a plant to produce more electricity per unit of fuel burned can lead to an increase in its projected 
future emissions, since better efficiency will often result in higher projected utilization. Such projects can 
trigger NSR, even if they reduce emissions in the region, because they induced changes in the utilization of 
other facilities. 
90Routine maintenance, repair, and replacement activities are recognized as falling outside the scope of the 
NSR program, but the line separating these activities from a change that would be covered by the NSR 
process is subject to uncertain and changing interpretation. See Gruenspecht & Stavins, New Source 
Review, supra note 67, at 21. Several enforcement actions against electric generators were initiated in 1999, 
alleging that the utilities had evaded NSR requirements by improperly classifying major upgrade and life-
extension projects as activities that do not count as major modifications under EPA’s regulations. See, e.g., 
Patrick D. Traylor, New Source Review Inoculation: Environmental Risk Management in the Face of 
Regulatory Uncertainty, HOGAN & HARTSON LLP FOCUS ON ENVIRONMENT, Mar. 2005.  
91In 2003, the Bush administration initiated changes in the NSR program, and some of those changes were 
intended to sharpen the threshold between routine maintenance and upgrades that would trigger NSR. As 
indicated previously, the research surveyed in this paper predates those changes, and hence this paper takes 
no position with regard to the impacts of the 2003 proposed changes. For a description of these changes and   20
over whether maintenance activities have crossed a threshold sufficient to justify forcing 
an old plant to meet new plant standards.
92 In the electricity sector, the deferral of 
maintenance compromises plant reliability, and thereby increases the risk of outages.
93 
 
6.3 NSR in Other Sectors 
 
  Although most empirical analyses regarding NSR have focused on the electricity 
generation sector, a number of studies have been carried out in other areas as well. As 
early as 1979, Hartman, Bozdogan, and Nadkarni analyzed the economic impacts of the 
Clean Air Act, including NSR, on the U.S. copper industry and detected what may have 
been the first evidence of negative effects on capacity growth.
94 Similarly, in the early 
1980s, an analysis by Crandall of eight industrial sectors offered quantitative estimates of 
what was then characterized as “new source bias.”
95 
 
  A more recent study examined whether the timing of plant investments was 
affected by the nature of regulation.
96 In a study of several industries over the period 
between 1963 and 1992, the researchers found that NSR significantly depressed the 
“birth” of new plants, keeping old plants in use.
97 For example, in an empirical analysis 
of the organic industrial chemicals industry, Becker and Henderson found that 
grandfathering of plants contributed to environmental degradation by raising survival 
rates, reducing plant turnover rates, and keeping otherwise unprofitable operations in 
business.
98 This also slowed improvements in air quality by prolonging the lives of older, 
dirtier plants.
99 They concluded that “a more uniform policy with respect to age would 
                                                                                                                                                                             
preliminary analyses of their affects, see generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON CHANGES IN THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAMS FOR STATIONARY SOURCES OF AIR 
POLLUTANTS (2005) (describing initial results of congressionally mandated investigation), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309095786/html/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) (on file with author). 
92 See Gruenspecht & Stavins, New Source Review , supra note 67, at 21-22. 
93For further discussion of the ways in which NSR may impede reinvestment in existing capital stock due 
to the uncertainty implicit in the NSR process, see UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
NEW  SOURCE  REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/nsr_report_to_president.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) (on file with 
author).  
94Raymond Hartman, Kirkor Bozdogan, & Ravindra M. Nadkarni, The Economic Impact of Environmental 
Regulations on the U.S. Copper Industry, 10 BELL J. ECON. 589, 593 (1979) (using an econometric model 
to simulate the impacts of environmental regulations on the U.S. copper industry).  
95ROBERT  W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING  INDUSTRIAL  POLLUTION: THE  ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF 
CLEAN  AIR  39-44 (The Brookings Institution 1983) (examining the effects of “new source bias” in 
regulations on compliance costs per unit of economic activity).  
96See generally, Randy Becker & Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulation on Polluting 
Industries, 108 J. POL. ECON. 379 (2000) (examining unintended impacts of air quality regulation).  
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
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have encouraged retrofitting and other antipollution activities of existing VOC
100 and 
NOx emitters much earlier in the regulatory process.”
101 
 
  What can be concluded from the empirical analyses that have been carried out on 
the effects of New Source Review, both in the electricity generating sector and in other 
sectors? First, there is considerable evidence that this form of VDR has retarded turnover 
of the capital stock, increased the age of plants, driven up the costs of environmental 
improvement, and had counter-productive effects on emissions in the electricity 
generating sector. Second, there is also evidence that NSR has promoted environmentally 
perverse decisions regarding the use of new (high-cost) capacity. Third, because NSR 
does not provide a continuous and effective incentive for emissions reductions at the old 
plants that typically are the most polluting in any sector, it has reduced cost-effectiveness 
of pollution control among existing plants. Fourth, although there has been no statistical 
analysis to date of the impacts of NSR on maintenance and improvements at old plants, 
theoretical arguments—if not common sense—provide support for these concerns. Fifth 
and finally, in a series of studies going back forty years or more, researchers have found 
statistical evidence in a number of other sectors of similar negative impacts of NSR 
regulations. 
 
7. Implications for Policy and Research 
 
  The theoretical and empirical findings regarding VDRs reported above have 
implications for public policy in the environmental realm. The results from previous 
studies also point the way to promising areas for future research. 
 
  Previous research has shown that VDRs drive up costs and can result in worse 
environmental quality than would have occurred if firms faced cost-effective regulation 
without a disincentive to invest in new, cleaner technologies. In some cases, where 
capital turnover rates are low and rates of technologically-driven environmental 
improvements are high, VDRs may actually lead to worse environmental quality than 
would result from an absence of regulation. Environmental regulation is often necessary 
to achieve emissions reductions, however. If in some cases it would make sense to 
abandon VDRs, what should be put in their place? 
 
  In the context of point sources, such as in the electricity generation sector, one 
approach would be to move toward a level playing field through even-handed regulation 
that motivates both old and new plants to cut emissions in order to achieve environmental 
objectives. This might be accomplished through a cap on total pollutant emissions 
together with the use of an allowance trading system to ensure that any emissions 
increases at one plant are balanced by offsetting reductions at another. The SO2 
allowance trading program in the 1990 Clean Air Act is one among many possible 
models.
102 No matter how emissions are initially allocated across plants, the owners of 
                                                           
100“VOC” refers to volatile organic compound. 
101Becker and Henderson, supra note 96 at 415.  
102See generally, Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from 
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existing facilities and those who wish to build new ones would face appropriate 
incentives with respect to retirement decisions, investment decisions, and decisions 
regarding the use of alternative fuels and technologies to reduce pollution.
103Thus, in 
principle, it should be possible to strengthen environmental laws by selectively and 
gradually phasing out reliance on VDRs, replacing some of these age-discriminatory 
mechanisms with binding environmental constraints, sometimes implemented through 
cost-effective, market-based policy instruments. 
 
  How might such selective and gradual phasing out proceed? Research has 
identified important trade-offs in VDR use, including short-term emissions increases 
versus long-term emissions reductions, and increases in unit abatement costs versus 
reductions in pollution levels.
104 Hence, it is necessary to ask which VDRs should 
actually be targeted for phase out. Much remains to be learned if such priorities are to be 
established. Research should focus on investigating the circumstances in which VDRs are 
most likely to be welfare-reducing compared with viable alternatives. Some of the 
relevant factors affecting the conditions under which VDRs are particularly troublesome 
can be identified, but future research will need to establish the relationships with greater 
rigor and quantify the magnitude of their respective effects. The list of candidates for 
further analysis includes the following. 
 
  First, as the natural economic life of the relevant durable good increases, so too 
does the potential for VDRs to reduce the rate of turnover of the capital stock. This is one 
of the reasons why the investment-retarding effects of the NSR program have been so 
pronounced in the electricity generation sector, particularly for large-scale, coal-fired 
plants. It is also the reason why the impacts of VDRs in the automotive sector may be 
becoming more severe over time. As the quality of motor vehicles has greatly improved, 
the average life of vehicles on the road has nearly doubled over the past twenty-five 
years.  What, empirically, is the relationship between the durability of a capital good and 
the effectiveness of VDRs? 
 
  Second, and conversely, a combination of circumstances may argue in favor of 
the retention of VDRs in spite of the impact they have on the lives of durable goods and 
thereby on abatement costs. If abatement cost heterogeneity is great, cost heterogeneity is 
highly correlated with vintage, and a cost-effective instrument is not feasible, then the 
static cost-effectiveness associated with an appropriate VDR may overwhelm the 
perverse dynamic effects on costs (and environmental performance). In these 
circumstances, VDRs may be the better choice. For example, the cost of retrofitting new 
pollution-abatement devices to existing fleets of cars is typically prohibitive (a situation 
that contrasts with the situation of retrofitting power plants). What degree of vintage-
                                                                                                                                                                             
allowance trading program).  
103Presumably requirements for localities to meet ambient air quality standards would remain in effect, 
preventing a concentration of emissions in any geographic region that would conflict with needs to protect 
public health. 
104 See sections 3 and 4, supra.   23
correlated abatement cost heterogeneity would make VDRs the most cost-effective policy 
instrument? 
 
  Third, if the rate of positive relevant technological change is great, that is, if 
newer vintages of given machines are also much cleaner, then VDRs can lead to an 
unintended inverse relationship between the stringency of regulation and aggregate 
emissions. For example, if the overall energy efficiency of some type of fuel-burning 
equipment is increasing with newer vintages, then newer vintages of the machine in 
question will likely have lower levels of air pollutant emissions per unit of services 
provided. By providing an incentive to keep the older equipment in place, a VDR can 
theoretically lead to an inverse relationship between the stringency of regulation and 
aggregate emissions. What rate of environmentally positive technological change in a 
given capital good renders VDR application problematic? 
 
  Fourth, the negative impacts of VDRs on pollution levels may be heightened if 
the older technology in question exhibits increasing emissions (degraded abatement) as it 
ages. For example, if the energy efficiency of the equipment degrades as it ages (and 
hence the emissions increase as the equipment ages), then the negative consequences of 
VDRs when they extend the lives of such durable goods will be heightened. What is the 
empirical relationship between the rate of age-correlated emissions increases and the 
potential perverse effects of VDRs? 
 
  Fifth, market structure matters. For example, selective deregulation of electricity 
markets has presumably rendered affected generators more sensitive to environmental 
compliance costs than they were in a world of rate-of-return regulation (when such 
compliance costs could typically be passed on to rate payers). This suggests that the 
negative consequences of VDRs may have increased, all else being equal, in this sector 
during the period of deregulation—a correlation that could be tested empirically.  Which 
market structures are likely to amplify the negative affects of VDRs? 
 
  Sixth and finally, the underlying regulatory structure itself seems significant. In 
theory, VDRs can be employed within the context of command-and-control instruments, 
such as technology-based standards, or within market-based systems, such as tradable 
permits. For example, a command-and-control instrument such as a uniform performance 
standard can involve VDRs, whereby old facilities are permitted one emissions rate and 
new facilities are limited to a more stringent rate. Likewise, in a tradable permit system, 
older units can be allocated larger numbers of permits, while newer units are allocated 
smaller numbers (or even none at all). How does the underlying regulatory structure in 
which a VDR is placed affect its effectiveness? 
 
  In sum, while theoretical analysis regarding the use of VDRs suggests clear 
hypotheses, there is need for more empirical analysis examining the actual effects of 
these age-discriminatory mechanisms in practice. Of the research possibilities discussed 
above, three areas stand out: the role of market structure in determining the effects of 
VDRs, the impact of VDRs on motor vehicle turnover rates, and the performance of 
VDRs in combination with alternative policy instruments.   24
 
7.1 The Role of Market Structure 
 
One area of research that has not been explored despite strong theoretical 
evidence to suggest its relevance is the role of market structure in determining the effects 
of VDRs. Theoretically, more competitive markets should exhibit more severe perverse 
consequences from VDRs: the competitive nature of these industries forces firms to seek 
cost savings wherever possible, including through prolonging the life of capital 
equipment in order to avoid incurring higher pollution abatement costs. Less competitive 
industries should be less vulnerable to such cost-saving pressures. A natural experiment 
on the effects of market structure on VDR outcomes occurred in the United States when 
several regions deregulated electricity markets while other regions maintained rate-of-
return regulations.
105 It would be illuminating to compare the rates of capital turnover in 
states with deregulated systems to states with regulated systems. 
 
  A variety of challenging methodological issues will need to be addressed in such 
research. First, there is the possibility that the policy variable—deregulation—is itself a 
function of various economic variables. The concern would be that unobservable factors 
(such as general economic conditions in a jurisdiction) that affect whether or not a plant 
is subject to deregulation also affect the frequency of pollution control equipment 
installation. For example, states that had the greatest costs from rate-of-return 
regulation
106 may have been those that opted to deregulate. If this were true, it would be 
essential to test whether the degree of inefficiency in the regulated system is correlated 
with the rate of turnover. If relevant deregulation decisions were largely political, in 
contrast, then they were exogenous to the rate of capital turnover. In either case, a careful 
consideration of the endogeneity issue is required.
107 The gradual and partial deregulation 
of the electricity generation industry is a promising natural experiment for analyzing the 
effect of market structure on capital turnover rates under VDRs. 
 
7.2 Impacts on Turnover of Mobile Capital 
 
  A critical issue with VDRs is their effect on the rate of retirement of durable 
goods. Research is needed in general on the rate of turnover of mobile capital, 
automobiles in particular. The longevity of American cars has increased, in part due to 
decreasing replacement part prices but new car sales continue to be significant.
108 One 
                                                           
105Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer, & Martin Heintzelman, Electricity Restructuring: Consequences and 
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106 Under conventional rate-of-return regulation, electricity generators were granted a local monopoly and 
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rate of return on their capital. 
107In addition, there might be a concern about the validity of the natural experiment if states that were not 
deregulated anticipated being deregulated in the near future. If there was uncertainty over future 
deregulation, then regulated states might not be a good control for what would have happened to the rate of 
capital turnover in the absence of deregulation. 
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can define the gross turnover rate for a given policy jurisdiction to be car retirements less 
new car sales and the net turnover rate to be the gross turnover rate plus transfers out of 
the area. The increased longevity of automobiles combined with an increased sales rate 
then implies that the gross turnover rate has been declining. But it is possible that the net 
turnover rate of automobiles has actually increased over the last decade. This would be 
the case if more people are buying newer cars and if the older cars, which have a longer 
life, are leaving the country (or state, in the case of California regulations).
109  
 
  A second natural experiment that might illuminate the effect of VDRs on the rate 
of automobile turnover comes from selective state implementation of vintage-
differentiated safety and emissions tests. In the northeastern states, for example, 
emissions test requirements are less stringent for older automobiles. Other states do not 
have emissions tests at all. This variation across states provides for the possibility of 
examining the effects of VDRs on automobile turnover rates. As with the possible study 
of the effect of deregulation on capital turnover in the electricity sector, this study would 
have to address the potential endogeneity of the policy variable, that is, the degree to 
which the policy variable is itself affected by economic forces. In particular, the density 
of urban areas in the northeast and the existence of reliable public transportation services 
may lead to lower turnover rates for automobiles in these states, even in the absence of 
VDRs. 
 
7.3 Performance of VDRs Combined with Alternative Policy Instruments 
 
  A third area of promising research concerns the interaction of VDRs with 
alternative policy instruments. As indicated above, Swift demonstrated that NSR 
requirements slowed the adoption of combined heat and power (CHP) systems.
110 In that 
case, combining vintage-differentiation with a technology standard in NSR created 
perverse incentives. Despite the fact that CHP systems were already highly efficient with 
low emissions, the technology standard required the addition of costly abatement 
equipment.
111 Hence, plants reasonably decided to forgo adopting CHP systems 
altogether. This negative effect of vintage-differentiation might have been reduced if the 
underlying regulation were performance-based rather than technology-based; that is, if it 
had emissions constraints rather than technology requirements. 
 
  One can imagine VDRs combined with alternative policy instruments in which 
the negative effects of VDRs are reduced, if not eliminated. The use of the SO2 allowance 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Future Discussion Paper 98-20,   1998) (documenting increase in commercial longevity of American 
automobiles).  
109In some policy situations, the relevant turnover rate would be the net rate. Older cars leaving the state or 
being sold in Mexico would not affect the ultimate policy outcome within a given jurisdiction. This would 
be the case for local air pollution in Los Angeles, for example. But if California is employing CO2 
standards for climate change policy then old cars going to Mexico constitute a problem. In this case, the 
relevant turnover rate would be the gross rate. 
110See Swift, supra note 77 at 1539-42. Swift refers to CHP plants as “combined cycle” plants, but the term 
refers to the same technology. 
111 Id. at 1539..    26
trading system in conjunction with NSR under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
may provide the basis for empirical analysis of the effects of VDRs under alternative 
policy regimes. Prior to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, affected facilities were 
regulated under a command-and-control system combined with VDR. After the 1990 
Amendments came into force, some plants were regulated under the allowance trading 
(cap and trade) system.
112 This combination of temporal and spatial variation may 
provide useful data for research on how effectively combination VDR and non-VDR 




  Vintage-differentiated regulations, in which later vintages face more stringent 
standards, play prominent roles in major Federal environmental statutes, state and local 
environmental laws, and a variety of non-environmental regulations. This is true despite 
the fact that economists and others have long argued that such age-discriminatory 
regulations can retard turnover of the capital stock, drive up the cost of environmental 
protection, and may retard pollution abatement.  U.S. environmental policy frequently 
relies on VDRs because of powerful political incentives for key constituencies to demand 
VDRs and for legislators to supply them. 
 
  With roots in standard investment theory, models of the impacts of vintage-
differentiated regulation have been developed over the past twenty-five years. Empirical 
analysis in the environmental realm has accelerated over that time. Much of that 
empirical analysis has focused on VDRs in the automotive sector and on New Source 
Review in the electric power generation sector. Overall, these empirical studies have 
validated theoretical findings that, all else being equal, vintage-differentiated regulations 
have retarded the turnover of durable goods and thereby increased aggregate pollution 
abatement costs. In some limited cases, empirical studies have also validated the 
particularly perverse potential consequence of VDRs—that environmental progress has 
itself been slowed. These theoretical and empirical findings point the way to what could 
be significant improvements in public policy in the environmental realm. At the same 
time, much more remains to be learned, and additional research efforts in this area are 
likely to produce unusually large dividends.  
 
  Given the ubiquitous political forces that have made vintage differentiated 
regulations in the environmental realm so attractive to interest groups and legislators, it is 
reasonable to question whether the phasing out of VDRs in select environmental policy 
applications advocated here really stands any chance of being implemented. In response, 
it should first be acknowledged that the battle will be difficult. But the same political 
forces that have brought about VDRs can also help bring about their reform. Many in the 
regulated community (particularly new entrants and existing firms that are growing 
rapidly) are disadvantaged by VDRs. As they come to recognize this, they can become a 
force for change. Equally important, when and where the environmental advocacy 
                                                           
112 See Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to 
Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 319-
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community comes to recognize that VDRs are systematically not cost-effective, they may 
begin to favor alternative, lower-cost regulatory approaches, knowing that lower 
compliance costs can translate through the political process into the achievement of more 
ambitious goals. And finally, when environmentalists accept that VDRs can in some 
circumstances be counter-productive, retarding rather than advancing environmental 
progress, then environmental advocates may themselves become enthusiastic agents for 






















Performance Standards for New and 
Existing Stationary Sources 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 
(2005) (establishing differentiated 
program for stationary sources); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7521-7554 (2005) 
(establishing differentiated 
standards for mobile sources) . 
Air Quality  Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle 
Engine Emissions Standards 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 
(2005) (establishing emissions 
standards for motor vehicles based 
on model year).  
  Non-Road Engines and Vehicles  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7547 
(2005) (applying standards only to 
new sources) .  
  Commercial Vehicle Standards  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7554 
(2005) (setting standards that apply 
only to buses manufactured 






Effluent Limits for Public 
Treatment Plants 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2005) (setting 
differential standards for plants in 
operation prior to July 1, 1977).  
  Drinking Water Treatment  Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300g-9(d)(4) (2005) (requiring 




Generation and Disposal of 
Hazardous and Solid Waste 
42 U.S.C. § 6925 (2005) (limiting 
new hazardous waste management 
to new facilities).  
 
State & Local 
Environmental Laws 
Stationary and Mobile Source 
Emission Limits; Energy-Efficiency 
Standards for New Construction; 
etc. 
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 39665-39669 (2005) 
(California Air Resources Board 
regulations setting differentiated 
emissions standards for new 
vehicles).  
 
 
 